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This paper provides exploratory evidence on corporate governance (CG) and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) interfaces. Although there remains a voluminous literature on CG and 
CSR, very little effort has been put forward to explore the nature of this relationship. Using 
interviews with senior executives of New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) listed firms, this 
research assesses CG and CSR practices, identifies barriers for CG and CSR adoption, and 
investigates the nature of the relationship between CG and CSR. The results indicate a 
moderate level of CG and CSR practices, with lack of resources and cost-time balance as 
common barriers for CG and CSR adoption. However, despite these barriers, we note that the 
majority of executives appreciate the increasing convergence between CG and CSR and believe 
that a more robust CG framework will lead to more sustainable CSR practices. These findings 
have important implications for managers and policymakers interested in understanding the 
CG-CSR nexus and promoting responsible business practices. 
 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; stakeholder theory; 






















The new millennium has witnessed a dramatic increase in social-, environmental- and 
governance-related scandals. Some well-known examples are the Deepwater BP oil spill 
(2010) and the Volkswagen emissions scandal (2015), where a common characteristic across 
them is the interplay between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) (Goranova & Ryan, 2015; Jain & Zaman, 2019). Such scandals have stimulated 
academic interest and research has been carried out to understand the interdependencies, 
synergies and convergence between CG and CSR (Jain & Jamali, 2016). However, the majority 
of CG and CSR research has ignored the managerial perception and has failed to develop our 
understanding of CG and CSR interrelationships (Jain & Jamali, 2016; Scherer & Voegtlin, 
2020; Zaman & Roudaki, 2019).  
Despite this lack in the literature, some studies have explored the nature of the CG-CSR 
relationship, particularly those examining the inter-relationship from a managerial perspective. 
For example, on the one hand, Jamali et al. (2008), drawing on in-depth interviews with the 
top managers of eight companies operating in Lebanon, find that the majority of managers 
conceive CG, as a pre-requisite for CSR. On the other hand, Young and Thyil (2014), 
interviewing managers from Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and India, reveal that 
managers perceive CSR as a dimension of CG. Similarly, Kolk and Pinkse (2010)  note an 
overlap of CG and CSR in CSR reports of multinational companies, while Elkington (2006) 
and Amoako (2017) consider CG and CSR as coexisting components of the same continuum. 
The underlying relationship between CG and CSR is centred on managerial thoughts, 
perceptions and contextual setting, and ignoring these characteristics leads to inconclusive 
results in the literature (Jain & Jamali, 2016; Kabir & Thai, 2017; Mansi et al., 2017; Tilt, 2016; 
Young & Thyil, 2014). 
This paper uses a qualitative approach to answer an unexplored research question in the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) context: How do NZX listed firms’ executives perceive 
the nature of the relationship between CG and CSR? This question is important in the New 
Zealand framework due to the recently revised 2017 NZX CG code. The revised CG code 
emphasises the role of the board of directors in considering environmental and social factors 
for the protection of stakeholders’ interests. In addition, this code encourages firms to develop 
and disclose a code of ethics, board committee charters and other governance documents to 




determine good CG as a pre-requisite for CSR practices. However, considering the divergent 
findings in the literature on the nature of the CG-CSR relationship, there is a timely need for 
the managerial views of that relationship. In addition, the understanding of the CG-CSR 
relationship is even more important for executives in firms in smaller markets, like New 
Zealand’s, where unique attributes of firms, such as smaller size, financial constraints, remote 
proximity, etc., worsen the problems concerning the effective implementation of CG and CSR. 
To answer our study’s research question, we interviewed 12 senior executives of ‘CSR 
champion’ NZX listed firms, i.e., firms following the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 
principles in implementing CG and CSR practices.  
The interview analysis for the assessment of CG practices suggests the dominance of 
compliance, transparency and disclosure-related governance aspects, such as the presence of 
highly concentrated ownership structures, well-structured and gender-diverse boards – 
including board independence, board committees and board gender diversity – and the presence 
of organisational codes. However, we find a limited number of firms having remuneration 
policies for board members and executives, with very few following a CSR-based matrix for 
executive remuneration.  
The assessment of CSR reveals that our sampled firms seem to establish an environmental-
focused CSR concept due to community concerns, concentrating on ‘waste management’ and 
‘emissions reduction’ initiatives – as New Zealand communities see the environment as 
important for their ‘clean and green’ image.  
Exploring the barriers for CG and CSR adoption, our findings indicate that compliance 
costs and the lack of shareholder activism are barriers to effective CG adoption, while the lack 
of resources, framework complexity and limited understanding about the CSR process are 
highlighted as barriers for CSR implementation.  
In terms of the nature of the relationship between CG and CSR, we find three conjectures. 
First, the executives believe CG is a pillar of CSR – pointing towards the notion that effective 
CSR requires a solid CG be in place. Second, CSR as a dimension of CG – accentuating the 
non-financial risk mitigation functions of CG. Third, both CG and CSR are part of the same 
continuum, i.e., CG-CSR coexistence – with the idea that corporate performance (including 
CSR) and conformance (CG) go hand-in-hand. In addition, although we identify three potential 
conjectures relating to the CG-CSR relationship in New Zealand – CG as a pillar of CSR, CSR 




highlighted by respondents as having particular significance. This implies that effective CG 
promotes firms’ CSR practices, supporting stakeholder centric CG perspective. 
Our paper makes several contributions to both the CG and CSR literature. First, we not 
only extend the research on the CG-CSR relationship by interviewing the top executives of 
firms in the smaller developed market of New Zealand (Jain & Jamali, 2016) but also add a 
more nuanced perspective by exploring the barriers for companies to incorporate CG and CSR. 
Second, the bulk of the CG and CSR literature has adopted a ‘black box approach’, i.e., a causal 
relationship between CG and CSR, ignoring the managerial perceptions and contextual setting 
which have raised mixed research findings (Aguilera et al., 2015; Jain & Jamali, 2016). Third, 
our study responds to recent calls for an inductive approach in the CG-CSR literature to take 
steps towards unravelling the CG-CSR relationship (Aguilera et al., 2015; Jain & Jamali, 2016; 
McNulty et al., 2013).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first provide some background 
information on New Zealand in section 2. We then summarize the recent relevant literature in 
section 3. Section 4 outlines the methodology of this study and Section 5 discusses the results 
of our analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
 
New Zealand Background 
 
New Zealand is a small and open economy, known for its business-friendly policies. The 
NZX and the Financial Market Authority (FMA) are accountable for promoting responsible 
business practices among listed firms. Businesses in New Zealand enjoy a relatively flexible 
CG and CSR legislative structure compared with their Anglo-Saxon counterparts Australia, the 
UK, the US and Canada (Reddy et al., 2008). New Zealand provides a unique environment to 
explore CG-CSR relationship. This is because NZ listed companies are only required to 
disclose some of the CG characteristics. For instance, listed companies in New Zealand are 
only required to disclose the equity interest of board members, ignoring the disclosure of 
CEOs’ and other high-level executives’ equity ownership. This non-disclosure of CEOs’ and 
executives’ remuneration triggers conflict between management and directors. Thus, the CEO 
and executives with a high equity interest might not be willing to undertake or effectively 
implement expensive CSR activities, thereby compromising the interests of other stakeholders’ 
groups (Zaman, 2018). This has been more recently captured by  Dobbs and Van Staden (2016). 




In most cases, CSR is used only to create the impression of being concerned about society and 
stakeholders. This not only raises significant questions about these companies’ commitment to 
CSR but also about their CG practices. 
Historically, CSR has not gained much management attention within the New Zealand 
context (Wells et al., 2014), while the opposite is found in CG, which has remained dominant 
due to its legal compliance requirements (Cassidy, 2017; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Hay et al., 
2017; Reddy, 2010). However, considering the growing prevalence of CG and CSR around the 
world, the NZX revised its best practice CG code in 2017 and included a clause about 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure, thus encouraging companies to adopt 
a more comprehensive responsible business approach (Zaman & Nadeem, 2019). The revised 
2017 NZX CG code pays special attention to CSR issues, aiming to promote ESG activities for 
listed companies.  
Despite the growing literature on CG and CSR, research in New Zealand remains very 
limited, with little focus on the CG-CSR relationship. In New Zealand, the majority of studies 
have individually focused on CSR (Bebbington et al., 2009; De Silva & Forbes, 2016; Dobbs 
& Van Staden, 2016) or CG (Cassidy, 2017; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Hay et al., 2017; Reddy, 
2010), and almost no attempt has been made to understand the CG-CSR interfaces. Therefore, 
considering the contextual dependencies of CG and CSR, it is important to explore managerial 
perceptions about the nature of the relationship using a New Zealand setting 
Literature Review 
CG and CSR definitions 
CG and CSR are socially constructed terms which have evolved over time (Dahlsrud, 
2008; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). Due to their interdisciplinary nature, there is no single agreed 
definition for either CG or CSR in the literature (Jain & Jamali, 2016). For instance, some 
scholars define CG as the way in which suppliers of corporate finance assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Others focus to adopt a 
managerial perspective and refer to CG as the set of “formal structures, informal structures, 
and processes that exist in oversight roles and responsibilities in the corporate context” 
(Hambrick et al., 2008, p. 381). These multiple definitions make it complex to assess what 
effective or good CG means. However, we followed Aguilera et al. (2015) and 
conceptualisation CG based on four key elements. First, effective CG involves protecting 




charge of running corporations. Second, good CG provides the necessary basis to solve or 
mediate the divergent interests of corporate stakeholders. Third, good CG promotes an 
environment of transparency or good quality reporting/disclosures. Finally, good CG involves 
the provision of strategic and ethical guidance for the company.  
Similar to CG, the concept of CSR is also associated with multiple definitions and 
interpretations (Dahlsrud, 2008). However, there is a general consensus among scholars that 
the term CSR refers to the means through which a company addresses the social, economic and 
environmental demands of stakeholders as well as the financial demands from shareholders 
(Aguilera et al., 2015; Schacter, 2005).  
Theocratical framework in CSR and CSR 
The historical overview shows that CG and CSR are two independent constructs, with distinct 
characteristics (Jain and Jamali 2019). However, due to the multiplicity associated with the 
definition, both have attracted wide scholarly attention across multiple disciplines. Its 
application in different disciplines has meant that there are multiple lenses through which to 
analyse the concepts of CG and CSR. Equally, there is not a generally accepted theory on CG 
and CSR interfaces (Jain & Jamali, 2016). Prior studies have selected one, or different 
combinations of theoretical perspectives (agency theory, stakeholder theory, institutional 
theory legitimacy theory and resources dependence theory) (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Glavas, 
2016; Jain & Jamali, 2016; Pisani et al., 2017; Rezaee, 2016) to explore CG and CSR interfaces. 
Of these approaches, stakeholder theory is the most dominant and widely adopted theoretical 
perspective in the larger common law jurisdiction – US, UK, AUS and Canada (Jain & Jamali, 
2016) – from which New Zealand has adopted many ideas and principles, including CG and 
CSR.  
We draw on the insights of stakeholder theory to explain CG-CSR interfaces in New Zealand 
for two important reasons. First, it broadens CG issues (i.e. boards’ responsibilities towards 
stakeholders rather than just providers of capital), contributing to stakeholders' management 
decisions based on who and what counts (Jamali, 2008; Jamali et al., 2008). Second, it 
facilitates increased awareness of CSR in CG structures that not only enables more informed 
decisions based on stakeholder satisfaction (Mitchell et al., 1997) but also remains important 
for accountability of these practices (Atkins & Maroun, 2018; Perrini & Tencati, 2006; 




Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholder theory is concerned with the relationship between a firm and its stakeholders. The 
roots of stakeholder theory can be traced in the literature back to Ansoff’s work in 1965 (cited 
in Roberts, 1992). However, the theory waned until the mid-1980s. Freeman was the first to 
use stakeholder theory in the business management literature (Freeman (1984). Stakeholder 
theory states that firms have relationships with a broad set of stakeholders, including 
employees, consumers, environmental regulators, government agencies and other shareholders 
(Freeman, 1984). Freeman (1984) argues that a firm should be characterised by its relationship 
with its stakeholders. He defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (p. 46).  The stakeholder view of 
Freeman held significant implications in the literature, but the Freeman classification of 
stakeholders was too broad. However, later developments in stakeholder theory classified 
stakeholders as groups or individuals who have a legitimate interest in a firm (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997). This classification serves the purpose of diverse 
stakeholders’ expectations and needs. A firm has to meet those diverse stakeholders’ 
expectations rather than only relying on the fulfilment of shareholders’ needs.  
There are two assumptions related to the fulfilment of diverse stakeholders’ needs: 
accountability and fairness. In terms of accountability, stakeholder theory argues that a firm is 
accountable to multiple stakeholders rather than merely to its shareholders (Deegan, 2013). In 
this view, firms need to perform activities that can be justified in the eyes of diverse 
stakeholders (Deegan, 2013). The second assumption states that firms’ interactions with 
stakeholders should be based on principles of fairness (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). Fairness 
contributes to a firm in three ways. First,  it establishes the process to divide the value created 
by the nexus of stakeholders among different parties per their proportion of stake in the firm 
(Cropanzano et al., 2001). Thus, it reflects a firm’s open and honest image to the stakeholder. 
Second, it reduce the contract cost to a certain extent, as a firm’s commitment to stakeholders 
in the fairness concept is derived through trust and self-enforcement rather than legal 
enforcement (Deegan, 2013; Richman, 2006). Finally, firms’ relationships with stakeholders 
tend to last longer (Dyer, 1996), which can generate greater value. The relevancy of stakeholder 
theory in the New Zealand context is established by the Companies Act 1993. It empowers 
companies to name any person as an “entitled person” to invoke statuary remedy against the 




apparent limitations on the constituencies that might be included in this category, allowing 
companies to include employees, suppliers, or any stakeholder as entitled persons. This 
framework also offers interesting possibilities to institutionalise the stakeholder principle in 
CG — shouldering more responsibilities on those charged with governance to make companies 
responsible to all stakeholders. In addition, the revised CG code (i.e. the 2017 NZX CG code) 
also emphasises that boards of directors should respect shareholders’ rights and should foster 
a constructive relationship and engagement with shareholders as well as stakeholders — 
justifying the relevance of stakeholders’ theory in the New Zealand socioeconomic context.  
CG and CSR relationship  
Stakeholder theory argues that both CG and CSR are important in managing and protection 
of multiple stakeholders’ interest (Aguilera et al., 2006). Although the two have traditionally 
evolved in relatively independent and compartmentalised streams of literature, there are signs 
of interdependence, overlaps and convergence between CG and CSR (Jain & Jamali, 2016). 
For instance, at one hand, the CG literature highlights the role of CG in the development of 
effective stakeholder management in order to have a better corporate understanding of CSR 
(Aguilera et al., 2006; Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016; Jain & Jamali, 2016). On other hand, CSR 
literature emphasises the need to uphold higher standards of responsibility in terms of 
organisational management, which in turn has implications for effective CG (Jamali, 2008; 
Jamali et al., 2008).  
Similarly, in CG the most important principle includes the accountability of companies 
operations towards the protection of stakeholders interests (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Short et 
al., 1999), while CSR comprises companies’ responsibility towards diverse stakeholders, such 
as the wider community and the environment, with special emphasis on accountability in the 
decision-making process (Adams & Zutshi, 2004; Aras et al., 2017; Atkins & Maroun, 2018; 
Carroll & Buchholtz, 2014). Such overlaps set CG-CSR research to progress along with three 
directions. The first strand adopts CSR as a function for CG (Bhuiyan et al., 2020; Filatotchev 
& Stahl, 2015; Young & Thyil, 2014). The second strand portrays CSR as a dimension of CG 
(Amoako, 2017; Frynas, 2010; Ho, 2005; Jian & Lee, 2015; Stanwick & Stanwick, 2001). 
While the third strand visualises CG and CSR as coexisting components of the same continuum 
(Amoako, 2017; Elkington, 2006). We elaborate on these concepts in the following section. 




This view emphasises the requirement of an effective CG structure to be in place before 
proceeding with CSR strategies implementation. Scholars under this view argue that the 
implementation of an effective CSR agenda is impossible without having solid CG practices in 
place. In this regard, Hancock (2005) presents an excellent CSR framework by identifying the 
key pillars of CSR. Among other important pillars for CSR, CG remained pivotal. CG is 
considered as a building block of CSR under this notion (Jamali et al., 2008).  
Consistency, with the views of scholars, considers that effective CG companies are more 
likely to engage in CSR activities (e.g. Elkington, 2006; Filatotchev & Stahl, 2015; García-
Sánchez et al., 2015; Husted, 2003; Jo & Harjoto, 2014; Kock et al., 2012; Young & Thyil, 
2014). Majority of empirics’ literature focuses on the effectiveness of CG structure (i.e. board 
composition, board committees, internal control i.e. audit structure and ownership structure) 
on companies CSR performance (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2019; Biswas et al., 2018; Jo & Harjoto, 
2014; Kock et al., 2012; Nadeem et al., 2017). However, the findings of this literature large 
remained inconclusive. One strand of literature found that effective CG increases CSR (Jain & 
Jamali, 2016; Rao & Tilt, 2016). While others found negative and no association of CG on 
CSR (Jain & Jamali, 2016). 
CSR as a dimension of CG 
The second strand portrays CSR as a dimension of CG. It suggests that CSR does not only 
reflect the CG structure, but it can shape them.  Scholars attribute this concept with recent 
listing and reporting requirement i.e. the recent NZX revised CG Code (2017) focusing on non-
financial disclosure, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) CG Principles on Sustainability 
Reporting (2014), the Singapore Stock Exchange (SSE) Sustainability Reporting Guide (2016), 
the mandatory ESG disclosure of listed firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the 
US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), in which companies 
were required to incorporate CSR as part of their CG compliance1 (Zaman, 2018).  
 
1 For more about the CSR guidelines for the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), the Bombay Stock Exchange 
(BSE), the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX), and the Singaporean Exchange Limited (SGX) please see, ASX 
Corporate Governance Council. (2014). Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. 
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-3rd-edn.pdf, 
Bombay Stock Exchange. (2013). Regulatory Requirements. 
http://www.bseindia.com/static/about/regulatory_requirements.aspx?expandable=4, New Zealand Stock 
Exchange. (2017). NZX Corporate Governance Code. https://www.nzx.com/files/attachments/257864.pdf and 






 CSR as a dimension of CG extending CG duties, consider CSR as a tool to promote 
effective and responsible governance. Scholars under this depiction argue that consideration of 
CSR policies and practices promotes stakeholder engagement, which is the key function of 
effective CG (i.e. effective CG is all about the protection of stakeholder rights (Aoki, 2010). 
For example, Jun (2016), considering the CSR as a dimension of CG suggest that institutional 
pressures coming from the United Nations (UN), such as UN-backed international CSR 
guidelines, have led companies to adopt sound governance structures since these are perceived 
to provide the necessary companies level infrastructure to accelerate CG. Another study by 
Kong (2013) suggests that CSR positively affects minority investors’ participation in corporate 
governance (Kong, 2013). Researchers considering CSR as a dimension of CG also found that 
high responsible companies follow fair executive compensation packages (i.e. a mechanism of 
CG) (Cai et al., 2011; Maas, 2018).    
CG and CSR coexist 
The third strand visualises CG and CSR as coexisting constructs (e.g Bhimani & 
Soonawalla, 2005; Campbell, 2006; Li et al., 2010; Ortas et al., 2015; Sacconi, 2006). Bhimani 
and Soonawalla (2005) note that good corporate performance is not possible without corporate 
conformity. For example, they consider that poor CG and misleading financial statements are 
one side of the corporate coin – the other side [is] poor CSR’ (Bhimani & Soonawalla, 2005). 
They further introduce a firm continuum where corporate performance is at one end and 
conformity on the other, meaning that firms should take an integrated approach towards 
reconciling conformity and performance reporting issues. Jamali et al. (2008) further elaborate 
on this continuum, noting that legally binding requirements are being increasingly embodied 
in governance mechanisms requiring compliance and conformity, and self‐regulatory 
stakeholder and CSR initiatives, which are evidence of voluntary corporate social performance. 
This view of corporate continuum sees CG and CSR as part of the same continuum. Under this 
view, a successful company without CSR will only be considered a half-successful and a failed 
company will be the one that has poor CG as one-half and bad CSR at another half (Aras & 
Crowther, 2008; Elkington, 2006).  
The emergence of these interfaces is because CG and CSR are multi-disciplinary constructs 
that create a uniformity of goals within and across companies (Aras & Crowther, 2008). The 
underlying relationship between CG and CSR focuses on those organisational activities that 
have a substantial impact on stakeholders and the external environment (Kolk, 2008; O’Dwyer, 




connection and interdependency between CG and CSR. Despite the growing interest in CG and 
CSR research, the exact nature of this relationship has not yet been completely determined 
(Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016; Jain & Jamali, 2016; Zaman, 2018).  We argue that the relationship 
between CG and CSR is a complex, but a vital one for each of discuss logics and merit further 
academic attention.  
In addition, to the nature of complexity in the relationship between CG and CSR, there are 
challenges that have the potential to impact managerial perception about CG and CSR 
(Bebbington et al., 2009; O'Dwyer et al., 2005; Woodward et al., 2001). In line with stakeholder 
theory perspective, both CG and CSR aims to promote accountability through effective 
stakeholders’ engagement (Cooper & Owen, 2007). However, accountability and stakeholder 
engagement processes consume a considerable amount of company resources and often depend 
on managerial perception (Atkins & Maroun, 2018; Farooq & De Villiers, 2019). For example, 
the companies would need to spend both time and money to ensure their actions comply with 
codes of conduct (a CG mechanism). Similarly, CSR practices also need resources in the form 
of improved employment benefits, community engagement, technological innovation to 
prevent certain emissions and, sometimes, charitable activities. In addition, executives who 
wish to make their organisations better corporate citizens face significant obstacles (Kaur & 
Lodhia, 2019). If they undertake costly initiatives that their rivals do not embrace, they risk 
eroding their competitive positions. An appropriate allocation of resources towards CG and 
CSR implementation could result in organisation’s value maximization, whereas an 
overinvestment (i.e. managers invest in CSR due to their personal gains) might result in 
compromising the rights of one stakeholders’ group i.e. shareholders (Barnea & Rubin, 2010).   
Therefore, to develop a better understanding and to uncover the nature of the CG-CSR 
relationship, this study is an attempt to answer an important yet less explored research question 
in the New Zealand socio-economic context: How do NZX listed firms’ executives perceive the 
nature of the relationship between CG and CSR?  
Research Methodology 
A ‘purposive sampling’2 is adopted in which we locate managers working in NZX listed 
firms who are actively engaged in promoting CSR or at least claim to be socially responsible. 
 
2 In purposive sampling, the participants are selected either by key characteristics, such as knowledge, skills and 




We select NZX listed firms because listed firms, in comparison with non-listed entities, face 
greater regulation around CG and are expected to set an example for other companies. Thus, 
listed entities offer a good population for addressing the research sample specifications. 
Second, to answer the study research question, we require informed participants that are 
familiar with CSR processes (Farooq & De Villiers, 2017, 2019). Firms' management 
undertaking CSR activities are considered as informed participants for this study. To do this, 
we search the GRI database to identify firms publishing CSR reports that meet the requirements 
of internationally recognised standards3. Such firms may be considered the industry leaders in 
terms of adopting CSR, or at least in their claims of adopting CSR. Of note, we explicitly 
verified all NZX listed company’s website to rule out any possibility of companies being 
excluded from the GRI database despite following GRI standard. This process results in 18 
companies meeting the pre-determined sampling criteria.  
After finalising the sample, we then search for study participants and their contact 
information. We develop a database of our sampled firms, containing publicly available 
information about executive leaders, including name, designation, LinkedIn profile, and email 
address or phone number. We then contact the participants via email or phone, inviting them 
to participate in our study based on their involvement in organisational CSR processes. We 
have selected one participant from each firm and we explicitly mention, in our email scripts 
that if they believe there is someone else in their organisation more suitable (based on 
familiarity with CSR), we would appreciate them forwarding this email to them. This ensures 
the informed participants' criteria of the study. Once a manager agrees to participate, we send 
an email outlining the scope and aim of the study, the rights of participants and a participant 
consent form.   
Of the 18 companies, six declines the interview invitation on grounds such as internal 
restructuring, management re-shuffling and overall busy-ness. Finally, we were able to 
interview 12 company managers, the number of interviewees appears reasonable regarding the 
topic and scope of our study (Parker & Northcott, 2016), given the limited number of NZX 
 
research phenomena Parker, L. D., & Northcott, D. (2016). Qualitative generalising in accounting research: 
concepts and strategies. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal. We adopt purposive sampling, as a 
limited number of NZX listed firms have a formal CSR program Dobbs, S., & Van Staden, C. (2016). Motivations 
for corporate social and environmental reporting: New Zealand evidence. Sustainability Accounting, Management 
and Policy Journal, 7(3), 449-472. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/SAMPJ-08-2015-0070 . 




listed companies having formal CSR programs (Dobbs & Van Staden, 2016) and the 
characteristics of the interviewees in this research, the majority of them being senior 
management. We also monitor data saturation throughout the coding process. We find no new 
code emerges after the 10th interview. However, we also include two additional interviews to 




We design an interview protocol to help the interviewers and to encourage participants to 
relax and talk freely (Hermanowicz, 2002).  The interview protocol contains a welcome note, 
the interview purpose, interview format and a set of interview questions, supported by 
additional questions to enable interviewers to delve deeper and explore sub-themes (Farooq & 
De Villiers, 2019). The set of questions included the following topics: (1) CG and CSR 
practices in the organization, (2) CG and CSR barriers and (3) The relationship between CG 
and CSR. After establishing the interview protocol, the researcher organised a pilot study. Pilot 
interviews enable a researcher to identify ambiguities, difficulties and unnecessary questions 
and subsequently to discard or modified them. It also increases the validity of the research 
instruments by determining that interview questions are appropriate (Van Teijlingen et al., 
2001). To perform the pilot study, four organisations outside4 the NZX listing requirement 
were identified. The CSR managers of these firms were contacted using their details, identified 
via organisational websites. The pilot study interviews revealed that the interview protocol 
proved that the information provided was clear and sufficient. 
 
Interviews 
All the interviews are conducted face-to-face at the respondents’ company offices, located in 
three New Zealand cities – Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch – between February and 
August 2017. Of note, to avoid biases resulting from the differences arising out of the multi 
teams involved in the interview process, the lead researcher undertook all the interviews and 
 
4 The current research used slightly different criteria for selecting the pilot study respondent as compared to main 
study sample criteria, due to a lower number of actual respondent companies. We selected four organisations 
based on the GRI criteria, while relaxing the NZX listing requirement. These differences in the sampling 
procedure for pilot study had two benefits; first the study achieved the pilot study benefits without losing the 
actual sample. Second; this meant that the study was able to include unlisted firm feedback and gain industrial 




transcription. To ensure reliability, we have followed several steps, such as the development of 
an interview guide, the pilot testing of interviews, the adoption of face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews, the audio recording of all interviews, the preference for self-interview transcription 
(rather than third party transcription) and the presentation of long raw data in the analysis. 
Further, to maintain validity, we followed purposive sampling to identify informed senior 
managers of NZX listed firms. These senior managers were in a position to best describe the 
research problem.  
The majority of interviewees are in executive management positions, such as chief 
financial officer (CFO), company secretary, executive general manager, head of government 
relations, and CSR and general manager of sustainability. The average interview time is 47 
minutes, with a minimum of 39 minutes and a maximum of 62 minutes. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the interviews conducted. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Thematic analysis 
 
We transcribe audio interviews and validate them from the interviewee (Gibbs, 2002). We 
then apply thematic analysis to identify codes and themes using the N-Vivo 11 software (Gibbs, 
2002). More specifically, we start with open coding – line-by-line reading of the transcripts 
and creating the code names for the issue discussed – resulting in 107 codes. The process is 
repeated, where issues related to sub-themes and linked themes are also developed based on 
the interview guide. The final themes and sub-themes that emerge from the interviews are 
presented in Table 2 and are reflected in our findings section. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Findings and Discussion 
  
We identify and explain three themes with the aim of developing a better understanding of 
CG and CSR interfaces.  
  





All interviewees discuss ways in which their institutions integrate multiple CG aspects into 
their firms’ practices, with the most frequently highlighted aspects those revolving around 
compliance, transparency and disclosure.:        
“…. Good CG is about saying decisions, transparency, the way you 
govern these businesses and execute your duties to achieve certain 
standards…. [SM11]” 
Further inquiry about their firm CG practices shows that firms in the current study exhibited 
mixed ownership structures (i.e. institutional, family, government and individuals). However, 
the majority of our sampled firms possess block-holding (an excess of 5% of shares belong to 
single shareholders), contrary to the US and the UK where corporate ownership is more diverse 
(Chung et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2012; Holderness, 2007; Jiang et al., 2009; Kong, 2013). The 
majority of scholars argue that large bock holding being central to firms might have different 
interests from those minority shareholdings (Edmans, 2009). Large shareholding thus may 
have more influence on the company than dispersed small shareholders due to their strong 
incentives and more effective monitoring (Alleyne et al., 2014; Del Guercio et al., 2008; Jiang, 
2009; Jiang et al., 2009).  For instance, these shareholders structure can provide external 
monitoring and direct dialogues with top management and therefore, the higher percentage of 
block holders are in a better position to protect their rights than minority shareholders – leading 
to better CG practices (as minority shareholders protection is the core of effective CG) 
(Aguilera et al., 2015). 
 In the majority of cases, the firms have well-structured and gender-diverse boards. On 
average, they have eight directors. In half of the cases, the firms have remuneration policies for 
board members as well as executives, highlighting the link between remuneration and 
performance. As one of the interviewees stated: 
“…. the CEO is awarded […] against financial, health and safety 
strategic goals are met… [SM3]” 
In all cases, the firms have developed codes and policies for CG and are disclosing the relevant 
information to shareholders and stakeholders.  
“We have codes of conduct in place [….] from diversity, inclusivity 




Apparently, CG code and disclosure practices reflect compliance type of CG. 
However, upon inquiry, the managers have specifically emphasized the broader 
scope of such practices for the protection of minority shareholders.  
“……You are not giving light disclosures about things that have 
happened or fear of insider trading or all those sorts of other things 
that can really impact on a local market, so it’s about attracting 
international shareholders, as much as investors as much as it is about 
creating surety for mom and dad shareholders, that you are using their 
money under best ways…. [SM11]” 
These CG practices indicate the strength of the CG structure for our sampled firms, 
attributing them to the NZX strategic guidelines and the regular monitoring of internal control 
mechanisms. However, there is ample evidence from the above quote such as health and safety 
linked compensation schemes, code of conduct for diversity and inclusivity, and due diligence 
for minority shareholders that managers in NZX listed firms follow the stakeholders-oriented 
CG rather than shareholder centric CG model. 
Despite having good CG practices, respondents highlight resource heaviness and a lack of 
shareholder pressure as barriers to promote best CG practices. First, one is indicated as a barrier 
for effective CG by six interviewees and is noted by one of the interviewees as  
“…There are two parts to that resource heaviness. There’s obviously 
legal compliance, I have a lawyer who will do it, who will focus on, and 
that pretty much for a company this size, if you are doing the board 
agenda’s it’s probably a full-time job […] it also consumes quite a lot 
of board time… [SM4]”.  
These senior management’s concerns for CG implementation reflect the NZX contextual 
settings5. Additional inquiry of the reasons for being resource heaviness has established the 
linked this with small capital structure. The managers particular are not happy with the non-
consideration of company size in NZX CG principle implementations.    
 
5 NZX is a relatively small stock exchange with a total market capitalisation of only US$98.68 billion at end of 
the January 2018 period. It represents just 0.32% of the Asia Pacific region, well behind its regional counterparts 
– Australia, Japan, Korea and Singapore (World Federation of Exchanges 2018). Due to their small capitalisation, 
NZX listed firms find it hard to balance the time and costs associated with these CG practices, as indicated by one 




“We are a small company, so the same rules apply, no matter what size 
company you are. So, in a larger company, they’ll have an investor’s 
relations team and they’ll have a corporate secretarial team and we 
don’t have that so that’s the main barrier, it’s actually just resources... 
[SM5]”. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that regulatory burdens on firms and businesses 
have increased significantly with resource requirements in terms of the time and costs 
associated with gaining an understanding of new and amended compliance imperatives 
(MacNeil & Li, 2006; Short et al., 1999). Hence, it is vital for NZX where a significant number 
of firms have small capital structures to introduce the size-specific CG provisions. 
Second, the lack of shareholder activism is also reported as barriers to effective CG 
implementation. 
“I think, there is a lack of pressure to improve, you know, we do not have a degree 
of shareholder activism in this country [SM11]”. 
Shareholder activism reflects the pressure exerted by shareholders to influence company 
policies and practices (Aguilera et al., 2015). Although shareholder activism encompasses 
activities such as letters of warning, proxy battles, litigation, discussion with corporate 
managers and annual general meeting proposals  (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Aguilera et al., 
2015), the majority of the CG research focuses on the shareholder proposal – a written 
recommendation form shareholders formally submitted to a company advocating a particular 
course of action (Aguilera et al., 2015). The added benefits brought by shareholders are well 
documented in the existing literature; shareholders not only influence firms’ financial 
performance but are also considered important in terms of encouraging firms to adopt best CG 
practices (Brav et al. 2008; Del Guercio et al. 2008). However, the NZX listed companies, 
despite having highly concentrated ownership, generally lacks shareholder activists, which 
might be one of the reasons these firms lag in terms of certain CG activities (i.e. disclosure of 
executive remuneration etc.) (Jiang et al., 2009). Even though NZX listed firms have higher 
levels of institutional ownership and tend to be highly concentrated, their ability or willingness 
to monitor firm management is at best weak (Jiang 2009). One of the potential reasons for 
ineffective shareholder pressure seems related to the geographic dispersion of ownership 




activism that promotes information transparency and disclosure (a mechanism of CG), while 
stakeholders centric activism focuses more on making companies accountable towards society 
(Aguilera et al., 2015). Therefore, it is recommended that local institutional shareholding 
improve to bring about effective monitoring and tension between shareholder centric activism 
and stakeholder centric activism need to be considered. 
Despite these limitations (i.e.  CG being labelled as resources heavy and the absence of 
shareholder activists in firm ownership structures) and compliance requirement, we have asked 
respondents about the motives to engage effective CG practices. The managers seem to achieve 
stakeholder satisfaction as core motives of effective CG – reiterating the stakeholder concept 
of CG among NZX listed firms.  
    
 “Good quality CG attracts [stakeholders]…. poor quality CG practices 
turn the [stakeholders] off from the business…[SM11]”. 
Overall this study of NZX listed firms reveals a moderated CG structure. However, contrary to 
other developed countries, like the US, the UK and Australia, we found that in some CG aspect 
NZX listed companies still lag (i.e. higher concentrated ownership structures, a lack of policies 
for remuneration and remuneration disclosure). We also summarised these results in Table 3. 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of board composition, while Panel B shows a summary 
of ownership structure and CG policies assessments highlighted by the participants 
CSR practices assessment 
 
CSR is a relatively new and developing field in the New Zealand context. Interviewees are 
asked to discuss what CSR means to their organisation, with a significant number of managers 
consistently referring to the community and the environment.  
 
“...understanding the positive and negative environmental and social 
impacts we have and reducing the environmental impacts and 
increasing the positive social ones in line with our business purpose or 
you know, what your business does [SM8]”. 
The community-related CSR concept covers several aspects, such as the promotion of 




effective services and engagement with local communities. Referring to the community aspect, 
one interviewee notes  
“...When we talk about corporate responsibility [….] we think about the 
impacts on society, that our organisation has while performing its core 
function… [SM1]”.  
Apart from the community, the environment is another dominant theme in the discussion. 
There is a clear focus on emission-reduction initiatives, and energy and waste reduction. For 
both of these environmental issues, management teams have established formal programmes, 
and they regularly review their environmental performance. As indicated by one of the senior 
managers:  
“…CSR is all about long term growth, minimising our […] environment 
footprint… [SM10]”. 
The increased engagement in environmental issues can be linked back to New Zealand 
‘clean and green’ image slogan and Resource Management Act 191 that encourage companies 
to undertake environmentally friendly activities  (Collins et al., 2010; Khan & Lockhart, 2019).  
The firms operating in New Zealand generally keep this slogan in mind when performing 
business operations (Collins et al., 2010; Khan & Lockhart, 2019). Besides, firms seemingly 
establish an environmental-focused CSR concept due to community concerns – New Zealand 
communities see the environment as important. Notably, in New Zealand, there are no 
mandatory CSR guidelines. In most cases, companies performed these practices to ensure 
stakeholder satisfaction, legitimacy and generalised community commitment (Zaman & 
Nadeem, 2019). From the above quote, it seems that the managers believe that voluntary 
incorporation of CSR not only satisfy stakeholders (this supports stakeholder theory) but in 
doing so they are also fulfilling their corporate responsibility. 
Prior literature indicates that companies are likely to experience a wide range of barriers in 
implementing CSR practices. These include the perception that CSR does not relate to their 
business and resource constraints, particularly, financial, human and time limitations (Gray et 
al., 1996; Hossain et al., 2016; Kaur & Lodhia, 2019; Mansi et al., 2017). These barriers may 
be interdependent, i.e., a barrier can depend on another one. Identification of the specific 
barriers and understanding their potential interdependencies may help managers to formulate 




highlight the three most common barriers for their CSR journey: framework complexity, 
limited understanding and cost-time balance.  
The first barrier is framework complexity because of CSR is a multidimensional concept 
and means different things to different people (Lozano, 2012; Murillo & Lozano, 2006; 
Woodward et al., 2001). The subjective nature of CSR often poses challenges for managers 
who formulate specific policies (Woodward et al., 2001). Several scholars have argued that the 
too many frameworks and complexity associated with the application of these frameworks limit 
effective CSR implementation (O'Dwyer et al., 2005; Pisani et al., 2017; Woodward et al., 
2001). Consistent with these arguments, our study also finds framework complexity as a key 
barrier for CSR implementation, as pointed out by a participant  
“…barriers is about the inconsistency and lack of clarity of CSR 
framework... [SM10]” 
Although NZX has issued the guidelines for ESG disclosure6, these guidelines are well short 
of providing the framework for CSR implementation.  
The second barrier is a limited understanding of CSR. Managers’ view is that there is a lack 
of understanding among stakeholders about CSR; for instance, one of the managers indicates:  
“…that other barriers are just people’s [stakeholders] understanding 
and perceptions so not everybody would understand what you’re talking 
about… [SM9]”.  
CSR requires a firm’s commitment to its stakeholders and this commitment often involves 
certain costs (Kaur & Lodhia, 2019; O'Dwyer et al., 2005; O’Dwyer, 2003; Woodward et al., 
2001). Managers expect that stakeholders acknowledge their effort regarding CSR initiatives; 
however, limited understanding of CSR among stakeholders can negatively influence 
organisational CSR efforts, resulting in stopping CSR investment (Kaur & Lodhia, 2019). This 
effect is more intense among firms operating in markets where CSR implementation is based 
on managerial voluntary discretion, like New Zealand. Management in those firms may choose 
to cease CSR investment if stakeholders are not recognising firms’ CSR commitment.   
The third barrier for effective CSR implementations is the cost and time to undertake CSR 
activities. As CSR practices cannot be implemented overnight, it is a task which requires 
substantial time and financial resources (Kaur & Lodhia, 2019; O'Dwyer et al., 2005; O’Dwyer, 
 





2003) and needs to be communicated to all management levels (Lodhia et al., 2020). 
Additionally, firms need to modify their current strategies and/or make structural changes to 
existing governance practices. Six managers in this study indicate that the cost-time balance 
hinders them from being able to effective implementation of CSR practices. One interviewee’s 
response is  
 
“…there’s cost [….] and cost not just in terms of […] obviously 
sponsorship is a direct cost but cost in terms of the product, cost of the 
products you buy but also the time it takes, you’ve got to do, you’ve got 
to spend a lot of time cross-functionally, you have to engage all functions 
in the business… [SM5]”.  
This is directly linked with the small capital structure of NZX listed companies compared with 
the UK or US firms, which potentially may affect CSR implementation (Roush et al., 2012).  
Given these barriers and the fact that CSR implementation is voluntary, we also ask why 
sampled firms engage in CSR practices. Interviewees note its benefits, mainly self-interest ones 
(Jamali et al. 2008). Senior managers appreciate the short-term and long-term benefits of CSR, 
particularly in terms of increasing profitability as well as improving firm credibility and 
trustworthiness in the eyes of internal and external stakeholders. One manager responds that 
CSR activities  
 
“…directly impact on the future profitability of the […] company. So, 
that was the driver, the initial driver for creating the sustainability 
role… [SM2]”. 
Overall, we find that stakeholders’ understanding of CSR as well as the time and costs 
associated with implementation, hinder the development of CSR practices. Firms intending to 
implement CSR policies should consider these barriers, by developing and revising their CSR 
strategies accordingly. Table 3 Panel C displays a summary of the barriers to CG and CSR 
implementation.  
 





After identifying CG and CSR practices and the barriers that NZX listed firms face in 
implementing these practices, interviewees are asked about the nature of the relationship 
between CG and CSR. The analysis reveals diverse managerial perceptions about the nature of 
the CG and CSR relationship. Three major themes emerge: (1) CG as a pillar of CSR, (2) CSR 
as a dimension of CG and (3) CG and CSR coexist. Figure 1 shows a diagram with these three 
types of relationships. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
CSR as a function of CG 
 
CG as a function of CSR is the most dominant among the themes identified. Seven out of 
12 respondents state that they consider CG as a function of CSR. According to the interviewees, 
good CG entails ensuring that firms operate in a socially responsible way, implying that the 
conception of CSR is necessarily anchored in a strong CG foundation. Likewise, one of the 
managers responds:  
“Well, the ideal relationship is that our governance will lead 
sustainability out across the organisation… [SM3]”.  
The manager suggests that the nature of CG invariability persuades managers and 
executives to emphasise particular goals and objectives concerning CSR. Another manager 
highlights the role of governance in CSR stating: 
“...relationship depends so much on the makeup of your governance 
structure and the level of appetite that the various parties involved, 
actually have around CSR, and if it’s there from the outset, then yes it 
would be driven by the governance feeding into it... [SM9]”. 
These views are consistent with Jamali et al. (2008), who consider that firms having 
effective CG strategies are more likely to engage in CSR activities. Extending this, Harjoto and 
Jo (2011) argue that in firms with effective CG, managers utilise CSR practices to reduce 
conflict between shareholders and stakeholders. In turn, fewer conflicts enhance stakeholder 
satisfaction and result in higher performance for shareholders. One of the managers summed it 
up as: 
 “…it’s inevitable if your business is run with good CG then this would 




practices that kind of philosophy embedded into the resource and ethics 
of the organisation can benefit the CSR, and associated with superior 
performance… [SM2]”.  
This conception of CG-CSR allows practitioners and researchers to explore how different 
configurations of CG structures and processes influence firms’ CSR policies and practices (Jain 
and Jamali 2016). We are not surprised by the significant number of interviewees viewing CSR 
as function CG since the majority of CG-CSR literature is based on this belief (Jain & Jamali, 
2016). More specifically, this notion relies on the effectiveness of several CG mechanisms – 
such as the composition of boards of directors, ownership structures and CEO compensation – 
and firm-specific CSR performance measures, predominantly rooted in agency and stakeholder 
theory (Benjamin et al., 2019; Biswas et al., 2018; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jain & Jamali, 2016).  
In line with stakeholder theory, this perception of CG as a function of CSR has established 
an important role of CG mechanisms, such as boards and ownership structure, first,  in setting 
corporate strategies including CSR strategies (Benjamin et al., 2019; Biswas et al., 2018; 
Nadeem et al., 2017), and second for effective monitoring of management to prevent 
irresponsible actions (Adams & Zutshi, 2004; Jain & Zaman, 2019). This view also assists 
policymakers and practitioners intended to promote CSR, as in the absence of good CG, the 
CSR initiatives might not be sustained.   
 
CSR as a dimension of CG 
 
The second theme that emerges from the interviews is the belief that CSR is a dimension 
of CG. Four out of 12 respondents favour this theme. CSR as a dimension of CG is the most 
sophisticated conception of CG because it provides a wider definition of CG and considers 
non-financial risk within the dimension of CG activities (Jamali et al. 2008). One of the 
manager’s views is  
 
“…corporate governance layer is there to provide oversight to the 
whole of the organisational activities. And CSR should be an element of 
the overall governance… [SM7]”.  
This perspective employs CSR as an extension of CG, wherein CG expands the concept of 




2011). In this view, there should be a clear ethical basis for businesses complying with the 
accepted norm of the society in which they are operating. One of the managers sums it up in 
the following manner  
 
“CSR is a form of corporate governance, yes. It’s a […]. It’s kind of a 
[….] you know it’s actually making sure that you are operating the 
company in an ethical way so… [SM5]”. 
These findings are consistent with Young and Thyil (2014), who find that CSR is an 
integral part of CG. Proponents with those who see CSR as a dimension of CG argue that being 
responsible to society – seen as an external responsibility – and to employees – seen as an 
internal responsibility – should be part of CG formulas and structures (Ho, 2005). Consistent 
with previous studies, CG embedding CSR policies and practices can promote stakeholder 
engagement, including customers, employees and society (Jamali, 2008). These are associated 
with effective governance, such as establishing transparent executive compensation (Mahoney 
& Thorne, 2005) and attracting institutional shareholders (Graves & Waddock, 1994). These 
practices are believed to yield business-related benefits not only for firms and shareholders but 
also for other stakeholders (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Greening & Gray, 1994). This view 
challenges agency theory by promoting a stakeholder governance model that is effectively 
derived from CSR policies and strategies (Kong, 2013).   
 
CG and CSR coexist 
 
That CG and CSR coexist is the third and final theme that emerges in our interviews with 
managers. This prospect is summarised by one of the participants:  
“…you can’t be a bad corporate citizen and expect to have the revenues, 
you can’t expect to have poor corporate governance practices and 
expect shareholders to support and invest in you. So, they are the 
underlying factors to your success as a company… [SM4]”.   
This argument suggests that CG and CSR are complementary and coexisting components 
of the same accountability continuum. In other words, the presence of CG standards and 
policies cannot replace a firm’s commitment to society and the environment, rather both exist 




attention; however, this has been counterbalanced by some interest in CSR. This is not 
surprising given that while CG is mandatory, CSR is not. In this viewpoint, firms are 
increasingly expected to address CG and CSR issues simultaneously. The emergence of ESG 
indexes and GRI reporting could be seen as a catalyst to promote this type of CG-CSR 
relationship in New Zealand firms. Viewing CG and CSR through this lens seems that both CG 
and CSR are not the same thing nor different rather an interrelated or reinforcing constructs. In 
their co-existence, CG emphasises on external compliance and monitoring and development of 
internal control, while CSR focus is more on the firm’s self-regulation and their commitment 
to stakeholders.  
Conclusion and Limitations  
 
Drawing on 12 face-to-face interviews with senior executives of ‘CSR champion’ NZX 
listed firms, this paper aims to explore the CG-CSR relationship using a New Zealand context. 
To do this, one broad research question is, how do NZX listed firms’ executives perceive the 
nature of the relationship between CG and CSR?  
First, the assessment of CG and CSR practices indicates management awareness and 
engagement. The most frequently highlighted aspects for CG revolve around compliance, 
transparency and disclosure, specifically codes of conduct, board committees, diversity and 
independence, while the CSR concept is mainly dominated by environmental and community-
related aspects, such as community engagement and event sponsorships. Second, exploring the 
barriers for CG and CSR adoption, we find compliance costs and a lack of shareholder pressure 
as barriers for CG, while lacking resources, framework complexity and the limited 
understanding of CSR are mentioned as barriers for effective implementation of CSR among 
NZX listed firms. Third, exploring the nature of the CG-CSR relationship, our findings suggest 
that most respondents appreciate the increasing convergence between CG and CSR and believe 
that more robust CG frameworks will lead to more sustainable CSR practices. In this regard, 
our evidence shows that the CSR agenda is the responsibility of top leadership.  
This paper attempts to explore the relationship between CG and CSR based on the views 
of the senior leadership of NZX listed firms. Previous studies in New Zealand focus either on 
CG or CSR (Dobbs and Van Staden 2016), ignoring the nature of the CG and CSR relationship. 
We include both CG and CSR in this exploration aiming to better understand the link between 
them. This paper also has important implications for not only the managers and policymakers 




the nature of a firm’s CG practices sets the overall tone for the organisation’s CSR activities. 
Therefore, practitioners and policymakers who intend to develop and promote CSR are 
required to strengthen firms’ governance structure. These findings also confirm the 
effectiveness of NZX’s recent initiatives, such as the revised CG Code in 2017, to empower 
boards to improve CSR practices and therefore have important implications for regulators 
across the globe.  
 Concurrently, mapping of barriers for CG and CSR also makes a significant contribution 
to understanding CG and CSR aspects at the organisational level. For instance, one of the main 
barriers identified in the analysis is the lack of resources; thus, managers and boards of directors 
responsible for resource planning and management duties need to consider this restriction while 
developing CG and CSR strategies. The findings are beneficial for education providers in 
developing the understanding of CG and CSR relationship among business students since 
Business Ethics and CSR concept is still in transition in many countries including New 
Zealand.  Our findings are also of interest for countries that are similar to New Zealand, 
especially those with companies with small capital structures. Our findings are of value to 
policymakers in that they recommend the consideration of resource requirements (i.e. financial 
threshold) in designing CSR guidelines/polices, as companies in smaller markets see additional 
CSR regulations as a burden on their resources which might have the potential to adversely 
influence their revenue-generation ability.  
We acknowledge some limitations of our study that provide worthwhile avenues for future 
research. First, the small sample size limits the generalisability of the research findings and 
hence additional research is required to test these outcomes. Second, we have not considered 
the managerial and industry characteristics in discussing our results. The tension between 
certain managerial characteristics, i.e., gender, designation and age, and industry 
characteristics, such as environmental sensitivity, might worthy to explore in future studies. 
Third, the findings are subject to social desirability bias, as managers might project good CG 
and CSR practices onto their organisations. Future research could conduct interviews with a 
wider range of stakeholders, which might provide added benefit in terms of identifying the 
tensions involved in managing CSR programmes across different stakeholder groups and in 
reducing social desirability bias. Fourth, we only consider CSR champion firms based on their 
inclusion in GRI database to explore the nature of the CG and CSR relationship, and this does 
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Table 1 Summary of interviewees and description of interview characteristics 






(h: mm: ss) 
Transcription (words) 
1 SM1 
Head of Government Relations & 
Corporate Responsibility 
07 BSc (Hons) 0:54:57 5877 
2 SM2 Sustainability Manager 10 MBA 0:42:01 4603 
3 SM3 Head of Sustainability 03 BSc (Hons) 0:41:20 4003 
4 SM4 Executive General Manager  05 BSc (Hons) 0:50:15 7127 
5 SM5 Chief Operating Officer & CFO 07 BSc (Hons) 0:45:03 4199 
6 SM6 Governance & Sustainability Manager 03 BSc/LLB (Hons) 0:40:50 4629 
7 SM7 Chief Financial Officer 08 BSc (Hons) 0:44:31 5334 
8 SM8 Sustainability Manager 03 BSc (Hons), PG Dip. 0:41:05 5101 
9 SM9 General Manager Sustainability 02 MSc 0:50:22 7874 
10 SM10 Company Secretary 06 LLB & B.S.Com 0:38:52 3894 
11 SM11 Group Chief Financial Officer 03 BA, AMP 1:02:11 7706 
12 SM12 Sustainability Manager 05 LLM 0:52:42 7073 
40 
 
Table 2 Major themes and sub-themes 
SN Themes Sub-themes 
1 Assessment of CG practices  
 
CG practices  
Barrier to adopt CG 
Motivations for CG 
2 Assessment of CSR practices  CSR practices  
Barriers to adopt CSR  
Motivations for CSR 
3 Assessment of CG-CSR relationships CG as pillar for CSR 
CSR as dimension of CG 
CG and CSR coexist 
 
 
Table 3 CG practices assessment 
 Descriptive Summary 
Panel A: Board Composition Assessment Mean Median Min Max 
Total number of directors  7.3 7.5 6 8 
Number of independent directors  6.6 7 4 8 
Number of women directors 2.4 2.5 1 4 
Number of board committees  2.9 3 2 4 
Panel B: Ownership Structure and CG Policies Assessment 
 
Number of firms 
Presence of concentrated ownership 12 
CSR-based matrix for executive remuneration 5 
Presence of organisational codes and policies 12 
Presence of disclosure policies 12 
  
Panel C: Barriers to adopt CG and CSR  
CG adoption Barriers  
      Resource heaviness  
      Lack of shareholder’s activism  
CSR adoption Barriers  
      Framework complexity  
      Limited understanding about CSR  
      Cost and time balance  










Figure 1 The CG-CSR relationship  
  
                   1) CG as a pillar of CSR         2) CSR as a dimension of CG 
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